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HAUERWAS, LIBERALISM,
AND PUBLIC REASON:
TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT?
STEPHEN MACEDO*
I
INTRODUCTION
As a theologian, Stanley Hauerwas offers a powerful Christian social
critique of our politics, law, and public culture, emphasizing the perceived
philosophical shortcomings of liberalism. Although I am neither a Christian
theologian nor a student of Christian theology, I recognize that Hauerwas is an
important, often penetrating, social critic. Nevertheless, his philosophical
account of the alleged shortcomings of liberalism frequently misfires.
Many of Hauerwas’s substantive moral concerns seem to me quite salutary:
he opposes our increasingly warlike foreign policy; he calls attention to the
plight of African Americans, the poor, the disabled, and the marginalized and
excluded generally, seeking to mobilize people to work on their behalf. He
expresses concern with sexual permissiveness, abortion, and the decline of
lifelong marital commitment. He seems to me obviously correct in his effort to
remind Christians that the example of Jesus and his cross should challenge us to
question the rampant materialism, consumerism, and self-concern that
characterize our popular culture. While I disagree with some of his specifics—
his strict pacifism for example—these substantive criticisms all seem to me
constructive contributions to public moral discussion.
However, Hauerwas’s concerns with the reigning public moral culture are
frequently aligned under a general philosophical characterization of
liberalism—and liberal law and politics—that seems to me caricatured and
unhelpful. The very fact that he uses the shorthand of “liberalism” to describe
the dominant culture is decidedly misleading for a number of reasons. To begin
with, many historical and cultural forces besides liberalism have influenced
1
American politics and culture. Moreover, the term “liberalism” can be used to
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1. The view associated with Louis Hartz’ 1955 work The Liberal Tradition in America that
America has been shaped by no political traditions other than liberalism has been widely discredited.
See generally BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994); ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997).
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cover a range of different and even opposed political positions. Our politics is
increasingly libertarian and conservative—or, “classical liberal” if you will—and
it drifts ever further from the concern with social justice that has been the
hallmark of egalitarian liberalism for decades. Hauerwas ascribes to liberalism a
variety of abstract philosophical commitments that have little, or nothing to do
2
with the theory and practice of liberal constitutionalism and politics.
With respect to his substantive moral concerns, Hauerwas writes mainly as
an anti-accommodationist Christian—that is, in opposition to Christians
accommodating themselves to the dominant culture. He complains that people
3
have misunderstood him as a “theological and political reactionary.” While he
obviously is not that, the confusion is understandable, and his jaundiced view of
liberalism may well aid the forces of political reaction, as Jeffrey Stout has also
4
suggested. To adequately assess liberalism, and to constructively address the
social and political problems that trouble Hauerwas, we need a livelier
appreciation than Hauerwas offers of the practical contributions of liberal
justice, rights, and constitutional institutions.
As I have said, I am neither a theologian nor a Hauerwas scholar. He writes
primarily as a theologian speaking to his fellow Christians about Christianity. I
am a political theorist who sympathizes strongly with the liberal political
tradition, properly understood. We are both concerned with our shared political
project and its justifiability, so that will be my focus here.
II
THE LIBERAL CORE AND IDEAL
“Liberalism” is a capacious term: the liberal tradition is complex and multistranded, or as Hauerwas himself has described it, “a many-faced and
5
historically ambiguous phenomenon.” There are various reasonable ways of
characterizing it. I understand liberalism’s moral core to be the emphasis on the
political importance of equal basic individual rights. Persons are understood, in
their political capacity, as free and equal, and an urgent political imperative is to
secure citizens in their basic interests understood in the language of rights and
justice. Basic liberal rights include various personal and political freedoms,
including the free exercise of religion, as well as positive entitlements—where

2. These are all familiar themes from liberalism’s communitarian critics, including Alasdair
MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel and others. Hauerwas is also evidently influenced by radical
democratic critics of liberalism, such as Sheldon Wolin, as well as other critics, including William
Connolly. Hauerwas may have arrived at his views independently, but he generously cites all of these
thinkers in his works. I have argued that liberalism has ample resources to respond to communitarian
and civic republican concerns. See generally STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP,
VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).
3. STANLEY HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD 208 (2010).
4. Jeffrey Stout, The Spirit of Democracy and the Rhetoric of Excess, 35 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 3,
21 (2007).
5. STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER 77 (1981); see also ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE 281 (1971).
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resources permit—to security, subsistence, due process of law, and, in general,
effective and popularly accountable government that secures basic common
6
interests. These protections must be secured institutionally, via the rule of law
7
and politically independent courts, constitutional design, regular opportunities
to hold public officials accountable, and a generally supportive public or civic
culture. Basic rights and liberties are not secure unless rights-consciousness and
civic values shape the major institutions and associations of society, including
those of civil society—the family, churches, for example—to some degree. The
liberal agenda so understood has been influential: the demand that legitimate
governments must secure citizens in a range of basic rights and that the people
must be able to hold their governments accountable has become a global
8
political morality. That seems to me an enormous moral advance, though also a
work in progress.
This core of basic normative claims is enhanced by those strains of our
political traditions and political philosophy that emphasize that all political
9
power should be accompanied by public reasons. This expectation is
continuous with the rule of law’s opposition to arbitrary power. In religiously
diverse political communities, these traditions would oppose the claim that
those who wield political power are accountable only to God or only to the
community of true believers. Public reasons are those whose force does not
depend upon embracing a particular view of what is true on religious,
philosophical, and other matters about which reasonable people disagree; we
have to work out the contours of our public morality in political practice
(pragmatically, if you wish). In conditions of diversity, public reasons furnish a
common court of appeal: standards that are accessible to all reasonable
members of the political community. It is best to try and work out our public
morality (or public philosophy, or constitutional framework) as a freestanding
and independent system of principled claims. There is no guarantee that
6. For a nice account, see HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (2d. ed. 1980), especially chapters 1–3.
7. Terms such as “politically independent” can provoke confusion: what I mean is that courts
often have some insulation from day-to-day partisan politics as practiced by elected legislatures.
However, the decision to create courts and give them power is a political decision, and the power they
wield and the decisions they make are political, though hopefully also principled. The virtue of courts
when they work reasonably well is the way they exercise power, not that in some deep sense they
transcend politics. In some of his writings, Hauerwas seems to think that liberalism rests on a deeper
and more problematic distinction between law and politics than is in fact the case (as if it’s committed
to a pre-legal-realism understanding of law).
8. See CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2009). For a sign of the progressive
development of these ideas, see The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A Primer, INT’L CRISIS GRP.,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/thematic/responsibility-to-protect.aspx/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2012).
9. I would identify this tradition most recently with Rawls and Habermas, but all they have done
is give philosophical expression to ideas that have long been part of democratic and constitutional
traditions. Judges have long deployed a standard of the “reasonable person” to indicate that a judge’s
reasoning must be widely publicly accessible if it is to be legitimate. See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 89 (1921). For political debate and practice, see generally
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1975).
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justified principles of political morality will be equal in their effects on, or equal
in their appeal to, each of the particular religious and philosophical worldviews
that citizens espouse.
Public reason is a democratic ideal that should be especially attractive in
conditions of diversity. With respect to religion, that means denominational
pluralism rather than either sectarianism or secularism, which is one of the
10
reasons the idea has long had appeal in the United States. From early on,
many Americans have recognized the value of a distinctive set of public
purposes, institutions, and reasons affirmed as “common” in the face of the
divisions and differences among the great variety of Christian communities and
11
other religious traditions. The American constitution itself represents and
promotes this aspiration to civic commonality in the face of great diversity.
I have mentioned the importance to liberalism of individual rights and other
constitutional guarantees as secured by society’s fundamental law—its
constitution. Some scholarly critics say that liberalism’s alliance with
constitutionalism and rights shows that it denies or displaces politics and
12
difference. But constitutions and specific constitutional guarantees (including
rights) are the product of political struggle. Their interpretation, enforcement,
and possible amendment animate much of our politics. It is good, for example,
that the First Amendment’s speech clause is generally understood to include the
right to criticize the government, and that gays are now recognized as having a
right to engage in intimate sexual relations without the threat of criminal
prosecution. Rights enable and protect diversity and differences, at least within
the limits of our civil equality. Moreover, the contours of our rights are subject
to constant contestation and reinterpretation. The core of some rights may be
largely secure in some places insofar as they are backed by institutional support
and a broad social consensus—in all areas of life, some issues get more or less
settled—but that only means that controversies have shifted elsewhere.
Law is just a way of organizing some of our politics: the decision to accord
some power to judges, for example, is a political decision (and one that has
been debated incessantly in American history). The idea that devices such as
law, rights, and constitutionalism displace politics is based on a simplistic
account of the relationship between activity and constraints in the realm of law
and politics. Just as commitments can be enabling in personal life (a point that
10. I understand that, from some points of view, today’s religious pluralism in America looks like
the predominance of secularist values. Insofar as religious Americans embrace the core values of liberal
democracy, their choices and preferences seem to me reasonable and humane. Insofar as the concern
with “secularism” pertains to excessive materialism, consumerism, self-centeredness, I share the
concern; but those aren’t liberal values.
11. I have written about this in the context of the common school movement, which began in the
late 1820s and which developed into the system of American public schooling. See generally STEPHEN
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY
(2000).
12. See, e.g., BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS (1993);
WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION (1995); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE
MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995).
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Professor Hauerwas makes eloquently) so they are in political life, as well.
Liberalism counts on shaping, to some degree, people’s extra-political
associations and communities, including families and religious communities.
Feminists have made this point very powerfully. The larger point is also a
truism in discussions of democratization. If it is insisted, for example, that
Shariah is the only source of law, and that claim is interpreted to mean that
religious authorities should be empowered to overturn laws and select
candidates for office, liberal democracy does not have much chance.
However, it is equally true that liberal rights protect the freedom of
associations and particular communities to resist full compliance with liberal
and democratic values. The Catholic Church is free to refuse to ordain women,
or to marry gays, and it can decide who is and who is not a Catholic in good
standing, eligible to receive the sacraments. Hard questions are bound to arise
at the boundary between religious free-exercise claims and state efforts to
advance important public purposes, including protections against arbitrary
forms of discrimination. A unanimous Supreme Court has recently held that
federal anti-discrimination laws do not apply to church employees who perform
14
religious duties. Should public funds flow to faith-based adoption agencies that
refuse categorically to place children with gay and lesbian couples?
Liberals disagree about the resolution of such hard cases, and there are
often no easy formulas for settling them. Competing substantive values need to
be weighed, and the crucial issues often concern contested empirical questions:
Is there, for example, credible evidence that gay marriage hurts families and
children? How many young Muslim women in France who wear hijab are
forced to do so against their will? Political communities’ constitutional
traditions are histories of such debates as they work through the political
process and are debated in the legislatures and courts, in newspapers and other
media, in churches and union halls, and even in scholarly journals of religion,
law, and philosophy. Some liberals will place great emphasis on respecting the
autonomy and integrity of churches and faith-based organizations; others will
place greater emphasis on combatting discrimination in all associations.
With respect to all of these matters, there is also a fair degree of reasonable
variation among different political communities’ constitutional and political
traditions. Particular formulations of basic rights and guarantees develop
around a political community’s constitution, written or otherwise. But these
formulations also coalesce around the tradition of a given constitution’s
interpretation and application, as well as the commitments and understandings
that effectively govern particular communities with unique histories. It is
extremely important that political processes provide for the weighing of
13. There are many excellent discussions of this theme. See generally CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND
CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE
IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004).
14. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012).
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complaints from adherents to particular religious or ethical ideals when they
believe that their commitments or practices are being unnecessarily or unfairly
burdened. Any decent ideal of public reasoning must include appropriate
venues for listening to and fairly weighing minority religious or ethical
complaints that are grounded in people’s deepest non-public religious and
ethical commitments. In the United States, this has been a primary concern of
the courts. This difficult task requires delicate judgments and practical wisdom
concerning how to balance public purposes—including the health, welfare, and
education of children as future citizens—with parental and religious concerns.
American judges and political institutions have often erred, but the
commitment to extending special attention to laws that burden the free exercise
of religion or discriminate against religious minorities is central to liberal
democratic constitutionalism.
Although public reasons and evidence ought ultimately to be authoritative
in a liberal democracy when deciding our most important political questions,
liberal democratic communities also can benefit enormously from the moral
energies and insights of particular religious communities and traditions. When
making law or formulating public policies for a religiously diverse community it
is not enough to say things like “when Christ disarmed Peter he disarmed all
15
soldiers for all time.” Religious claims of this sort may of course provoke
discussions that contribute to public deliberation in important ways. I hope and
believe that justice can be discerned and defended on the basis of publicly
accessible reasons and evidence, but unjust and murderous policies should be
fought with all of the resources at our disposal. While everyone should be free
to offer whatever reasons they think fit, and while religious reasons and
arguments do often contribute to public deliberation, it remains a basic
principle of political morality that those advocating for laws touching on
important matters that affect all communities ought to assure themselves that
those laws are justified to all on whom they are imposed.
Critics of liberalism often exaggerate the conflicts among religious and
liberal values. In fact, a norm of public reason tends to govern our national
politics, and as scholars such as Jon A. Shields have shown, that norm is
16
typically espoused even by religious activists on the Christian right.
The recent book by Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American
17
Grace, makes it clear that religious communities contribute to the health of
American civic life in a wide variety of ways. Religious Americans are more
civically active and trusting of others, and more apt to give their time and
money to charities, including secular charities; they express more altruistic
18
values and are “better neighbors,” according to Putnam and Campbell.
15. HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 273.
16. JON A. SHIELDS, THE DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (2009).
17. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE (2010).
18. Id. at 464, 471. Putnam and Campbell furnish evidence suggesting that the increased civic
activity is not the result of increased religiosity in the sense of belief or intensity of belief; rather, what
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Putnam and Campbell paint a generally (though not uniformly) positive picture
of the contributions of religious communities to the health of American
democracy and civic life. It would be natural to conclude on the basis of this
evidence that there is a considerable overlap between Christian virtue and the
virtues of American constitutional (or liberal) democracy. However, the various
civic contributions that Putnam and Campbell describe do not include some of
Hauerwas’s most distinctive concerns about American popular culture.
Hauerwas might say that religion’s various contributions to “good citizenship”
do not represent or reflect distinctively Christian virtues, at least as Hauerwas
understands them.
Liberalism, like Christianity, stands for the equal dignity of all persons. The
leading liberal political theorists—the very ones that Hauerwas criticizes, such
as Rawls—are principally concerned with reminding the rich what they owe to
the poor. This seems to me to resonate rather powerfully with Jesus’ mission on
earth, reaching out constantly to the less well-off, as he did, and admonishing
others do so. “But when you give a banquet, invite the poor, the crippled, the
19
lame, the blind, and you will be blessed.”
Liberal commitments give rise to what seem to me attractive civic virtues,
and ideals of democratic politics that are worth aspiring to. As Hauerwas
acknowledges, it makes sense to speak of “liberal virtues” and, I would add, a
liberal political community with distinctive traditions, practices, stories,
memories, and sense of history. Any adequate account of the civic virtues of
liberal democratic citizens would be quite capacious, and would have to include
such virtues as tolerance of reasonable forms of diversity, but also the
willingness to act in the face of injustice, sympathy with the less well-off, a
capacity to appreciate the point of view of others, and a willingness to support
fair terms of social cooperation. A subset of liberal democratic virtues includes
qualities associated with civil deliberation: politics should involve reason giving
and reason demanding, and we should seek to promote sounder understandings
of what justice requires. One can be a good citizen—courageous and effective in
opposing injustice in concert with others—without fully appreciating the virtues
of civil deliberation. (I return to these matters in the conclusion.)
It is widely recognized that the liberal tradition has its internal divisions,
perhaps the greatest one being the divergence of what is referred to as
“classical” versus more egalitarian approaches. Classical liberal scholars, such as
Friederich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, allowed for a social safety net, but
opposed institutional mechanisms designed to promote social justice and fair
equality of opportunity (Hayek famously thought the very idea of “social

matters are religious social networks, including having friends from church. Id. at 471–9. Deeply
observant religious people are more generous with their own time and money than their less religious
fellows, but they are less supportive of government policies to address the structural causes of poverty.
Id. at 256. Religious Americans are less tolerant of dissent, and Americans’ warmth toward people of
other faiths chills with respect to Mormons and especially Muslims. Id. at 509.
19. Luke 14:13.
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20

justice” was an oxymoron). The more egalitarian and democratic versions of
liberalism predominate in today’s academy, but classically liberal political
initiatives and ideas have enjoyed a remarkable resurgence in our politics since
the rise of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and indeed the “Tea Party.”
Egalitarian liberalism as a body of political theory—represented by John Rawls
and Ronald Dworkin and others, which tends to be referred to generically as
“liberalism”—gives philosophical expression to some of the commitments that
profoundly reshaped American politics and culture from the New Deal, to the
“Great Society” programs of the 1960s, and into the 1970s, with the
development of the welfare state; greater equality for blacks, women, and other
minorities (eventually including gays and lesbians); enhanced criminal due
21
process; fairer political representation; and greater personal freedom.
In the era after Thatcher and Reagan, egalitarian liberal ideas have had
diminishing influence in politics. Liberals are typically appalled by the vast and
growing inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunity in many Western
countries, including the United States. They also are dismayed at the profound
influence of money in politics and the increased marginalization of the poor.
The influence of liberal political principles of fairness and equal citizenship are
greater in the academy and educated circles generally, which has led to serious
efforts on the part of conservatives to promote their own version of “affirmative
action” for free-market and conservative ideas and academics. So it seems to
me that academic reflection concerning liberal justice and democracy has
improved enormously in the last hundred years, but, over the last thirty years in
particular, our practice has in many respects declined.
What I have offered here is a brief and selective reading of history, leaving
out much that has been espoused by people who thought of themselves as
“liberals” and who were so identified in public. Some “liberals” supported the
Vietnam war, especially early on, and no doubt many “liberals” have made a
variety of other terrible mistakes. Politics is a sprawling messy business and
there is a lot of room to do great damage. Hauerwas’s first published piece, An
Ethical Appraisal of Black Power, “suggested that the negative reaction of
white liberals to black power not only exposed shallow and platitudinous
sentiments such as ‘all men are created equal,’ but also robbed white liberals of
their attempt to relieve the guilt of being white by identifying with the civil
22
rights struggle.” I admire Hauerwas’s social radicalism and moral courage, and
most of all his eagerness to side with the underdog. However, just as he seeks to
understand Christianity at its best, I would say that we owe the same treatment
to liberalism. Both, after all, are complex traditions of thought and practice
informed by high moral aspirations and terrible actual failures.
As Jaroslav Pelikan has argued, the difference between a people’s history
20. See generally FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1976).
21. The story is obviously much more complicated than that, and includes earlier (and later)
progressive reforms.
22. HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 79.
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and its traditions is that the latter includes an element of critical moral
23
judgment. History is the morally checkered record of everything we have
done: some good, some bad. Our tradition, on the other hand, is that part of our
record that we endorse and wish to carry forward into the future: those of our
practices that we honor and wish to live up to, not forgetting our failures, but
keeping them in mind so as to try to avoid them in the future. So, while
Hauerwas describes liberalism as unrooted in history and tradition (he writes of
24
“the liberal attempt to form a politics and ethics without memory” ) we can
speak of the liberal tradition in America just as easily as we can of Christian
traditions.
III
HAUERWAS, CHRISTIANITY, AND LIBERALISM
Hauerwas sometimes seems to oppose liberalism root and branch. He takes
his bearings with respect to liberalism from its critics rather than its defenders,
with the result that Hauerwas often portrays liberalism at its worst, rather than
25
its best. It is hazardous and unfair to interpret a tradition of thought based
mainly on the claims of its harshest critics, as if taking one’s bearings on
Christianity from the late Christopher Hitchens. Yet that is often how
Hauerwas treats liberalism. Nevertheless, let us consider here some of the main
themes that run through Hauerwas’s positive teachings.
Hauerwas’s central aim seems to be to remind Christians of the
distinctiveness and demanding nature of their vocation and way of life, calling
upon them to follow Jesus and “be the Church,” the “peaceable kingdom.”
Contemporary Christians fail to comprehend distinctively Christian teachings
and virtues: they are too much in and of the public world and its culture. The
theological expression of this form of engaging with the world by assimilating
with it is Protestant liberalism. Hauerwas argues that Christians should instead
focus their attention on living within the church as Christians: worshipping
together as a community, practicing distinctive Christian virtues, and witnessing
26
to the truths revealed by Jesus’ cross and resurrection. To be a Christian in the
modern world, Hauerwas contends, requires a profound “transformation of the
self,” and “fidelity to the cross of Christ”; the Christian moral life “is not an
achievement easily accomplished by the many, but a demanding task that only a

23. See JAROLSAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 43–64 (1984).
24. STANLEY HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH: BONHOEFFER AND THE PRACTICE OF
NONVIOLENCE 224 (2004).
25. I greatly admire Sheldon Wolin, for example, and Politics and Vision, but his view of liberalism
there is deeply one-sided, and he is an unreliable guide to Rawls. I share Jeff Stout’s reservations about
“fugitive democracy,” as expressed in The Spirit of Democracy and the Rhetoric of Excess. See Stout,
supra note 4, at 16–19. Hauerwas describes being influenced by MacIntyre as well as Wolin, among
other critics of liberalism. See supra note 24, at 223–233.
26. See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in STANLEY
HAUERWAS, THE HAUERWAS READER 51, 51–74 (John Berkman & Michael Cartwright eds., 2001).
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few master.” Much of Hauerwas’s academic work contends that appreciation
of Christianity as a body of moral and practical knowledge of how we should
live will only follow actually living the Christian life in church communities:
following the way of Jesus and witnessing to Christian beliefs in one’s life, in the
28
faith that such a life is “with the grain of the universe.” His criticisms of
Christian ethics and his reliance on MacIntyre emphasize the rootedness of
moral (and spiritual) knowledge in particular practices and traditions, as well as
the narratives, stories, and roles that constitute and animate those traditions.
These can only be grasped from the inside and appreciated by those who live
those lives.
Hauerwas says that modern life is—in a variety of ways that he often lumps
under the rubric “liberalism”—hostile to the sort of life marked out for us by
Jesus. The values and way of life of “bourgeois liberalism” have colonized and
29
debased the Christian consciousness. American Christians have come to want
to be good citizens: to serve in the military, hold public office, and raise their
children to be “successful” as this is defined by our popular culture (that is,
prosperous, with a good career, individually fulfilled). In many ways this
represents the success of our civic culture: religious life has been fundamentally
reshaped by basic liberal and democratic values. But “civic aims” such as
justice, rights, the public good, economic security, national defense via
organized violence, social programs to help the poor, and the improvement of
American democracy, even at their best, Hauerwas seems to say, threaten to
distract Christians from their central mission. At their worst, as in the case of
violence and imperialism, these aims diametrically oppose Christian virtues,
Hauerwas contends. In our badly fallen world, the desire to be a “good citizen”
often implicates Christians in heinous collective enterprises.
In light of these challenges, Hauerwas calls upon Christians to live as
Christians and be constant witnesses to Jesus. They should take their ethical
and practical bearings from the ways of Jesus, as realized (or approximated) in
the most authentic and faithful Christian churches, not those of the marketplace
or the public square. In Hauerwas’s view, no particular denomination has a lock
on the truth since his personal search—eloquently recounted—has taken him to
30
faith communities with a variety of denominational affiliations.
If I read Hauerwas correctly, what are we (that is, those who believe in core
liberal democratic values and virtues, roughly as I do, believers or not) to make
of all this?

27. Id. at 70; see also STANLEY HAUERWAS, Jesus and the Social Embodiment of the Peaceable
Kingdom, in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 116.
28. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE 16–17, 231 (2001).
29. STANLEY HAUERWAS, Christianity: It’s Not a Religion, It’s an Adventure, in THE HAUERWAS
READER supra note 26, at 522, 528.
30. I have great admiration for the sorts of church communities Hauerwas describes favorably in
Hannah’s Child. See HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 254.
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A. The Liberal Core and Popular Culture
As an observer of American popular life and politics, there is much truth in
many of Hauerwas’s complaints. He seems to me an extremely interesting,
provocative, and frequently quite penetrating social critic. He has a keen eye
for our hypocrisies, self-serving myths, and prejudices. He is right that our
public culture is often profoundly and depressingly materialistic, self-centered,
individualistic, and enormously self-congratulatory; our foreign policy is far too
ready to resort to violence. Christians ought to challenge our dominant
materialist popular culture far more than they do, via alternative narratives and
radical criticisms that attend to the example of Jesus. But, as Hauerwas points
out, religious communities often seem only to rationalize and sanctify the
crassest, most self-serving, and least reflective aspects of our culture (the
widespread popularity of the prosperity gospel of such figures as Joel Osteen,
for example). Hauerwas’s challenges to modern bourgeois prejudices are often
to the point.
Hauerwas’s mode of writing is not that of political analysis or institutional
design, and I do not see an alternative political program in those of his writings
that I have looked at. His view of Christian ethics seems to involve doing the
right thing (as he understands it) and letting the consequences take care of
themselves. So, his commitment to pacifism is not defended as part of a political
program or plan in the usual sense: we should renounce war in the belief that
31
Jesus did and with faith that, well, our fate is in God’s hands . . . ? I’m not sure.
In some passages, including in his advocacy of pacifism, apparently even in the
face of the Nazi threat, he strikes me as astonishingly utopian, almost apolitical.
I also readily concede, however, that Americans, including American
Christians, err badly on the side of uncritical patriotism. We would, in fact, be
far better off if more Christians refused to serve in the armed forces as currently
constituted and deployed, and likewise insisted on adherence to the rules and
32
principles of just war theory as understood in much of the Christian tradition. I
applaud Hauerwas’s interventions in the wake of the September 11 attacks. He
offers a sort of alternative Christian political vision and an invitation to try it
out. He does not, so far as I can see, offer anything like a practical political
theory, or an argument for his politics addressed to a diverse audience.
It sometimes seems as though politics are peripheral to Hauerwas’s central
theological and religious concerns, and liberalism winds up being so much
collateral damage. Many of his central criticisms of the popular culture would
be joined by many liberals. I am perfectly prepared to join some (or many) of
Hauerwas’s complaints about American public life. The values that increasingly

31. Jeffrey Stout, who is far more familiar with Hauerwas’s voluminous writings than I, calls for
greater clarity from Hauerwas with respect to his positive program. See Stout, supra note 4, at 18.
32. See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, Should War be Eliminated?A Thought Experiment, in
THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 392, 392–425; see also STANLEY HAUERWAS, Why Gays
(as a Group) are Morally Superior to Christians (as a Group), in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note
26, at 519–21.
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shape popular culture, for example, are those of the marketplace and
consumerism. But these are not the core values of liberalism and democracy, or
at least there is no reason why an academic should smush all of these things
together. Hauerwas sometimes writes as though the core of “liberalism” is
classical liberalism—Adam Smith and John Locke—and even then he
exaggerates or oversimplifies their commitments to commercial values. When
Hauerwas says that “to conserve economic liberalism is antithetical to the
formation of communities capable of caring for one another in the name of the
33
common good,” he sounds a lot to me like a democratic egalitarian liberal like
Rawls or Dworkin. In contrast, he also places little emphasis on important
features of modern life that are absolutely central to liberal politics. He never
adequately grapples with the political problem of profound religious diversity,
and he is far more preoccupied by secularism.
B. Hauerwas and Economic Liberalism
Hauerwas’s main objects of attack often seem not to be the liberal core as I
have described it—fundamental human equality and rights, constitutional
institutions, democracy, and the welfare state—but rather, “economic
liberalism,” meaning capitalism and bourgeois popular culture, including the
sexual permissiveness that came out of the 1960s. “[U]nder the influence of
Macpherson I have always assumed my criticisms of liberalism were criticisms
34
of the dominance of capitalist modes of life.” I’m prepared to credit much of
Hauerwas’s reading of “bourgeois liberalism.” But this calls for a little
discrimination.
I wonder what Hauerwas makes of the fact that Rawls says that a capitalist
society, which he refers to as a capitalist welfare state, assuming its best form,
35
cannot be a just society. The fundamental problems Rawls ascribes to a
capitalist welfare state can be thought of as problems of culture and virtue. It
allows people to heap up and accumulate very unequal amounts of private
property, and then hopes that, at the end of the day, they will be willing to
redistribute it to the poor so that shares are fair. This is quite unrealistic, says
Rawls: it relies too heavily on the supposition that the greatly advantaged will
be stably committed to ongoing redistribution. What we need is to prevent
wealth and political power from accumulating in the first instance by steep
inheritance taxes and an insistence on fair equality of opportunity across
generations. That is, everyone must be furnished with the education and
resources needed to compete for the best jobs and positions of leadership.
Another important way in which Rawls distances himself from capitalism is
in denying that there is any necessary value in continued economic growth: once
33. HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 269.
34. HAUERWAS, supra note 24, at 228.
35. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 136–140 (2001) (discussing two
options concerning property and social provision that are consistent with liberal justice, namely,
democratic socialism and “property owning democracy”).
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we have enough stuff for the good life, a “steady state” economy is fine. Rawls
is in no way a celebrator of “commercial society” or “economic liberalism.”
Now, this may not be radical enough for Hauerwas, and Hauerwas may be
right. But we get nowhere in that discussion by caricaturing the original position
or ignoring the profound differences between classical and contemporary
liberals.
Even when it comes to the defenders of commercial society, or capitalism,
Hauerwas is sometimes unfair. His brief discussion of Adam Smith and his
37
influence in The Radical Hope is in some ways interesting and insightful, but
extremely one-sided. He has a sharp eye for all that is wrong with bourgeois
commercialism, but misses what was, for Smith, the essential saving grace.
Smith himself found many aspects of commercial society extremely
unattractive. This includes the absolute pivot of economic development—the
38
division of labor—which Smith describes as dehumanizing in its effects. He
knew that capitalists were constantly scheming to advantage themselves at the
39
expense of labor, while labor was the source of all value. And he was deeply
influenced by Rousseau’s criticisms of private property. One can play with
undergraduates a game that consists of reading aloud passages from Smith.
Often they guess that the author is Karl Marx, rather than the intellectual father
of capitalism. So the question is why, in spite of the many unlovely aspects of
commercialism, Smith still thought economic markets were a boon to human
welfare and a great moral improvement.
The answer is the lives it makes possible for the poor masses: lives freed of
utter poverty and misery. Smith had a Malthusian view. He believed the
birthrate would tend to outpace production, thus lowering wages to bare
subsistence or worse. Only a constantly growing economy, made possible by
progressive economic development, would raise the wages of workers above the
barest subsistence. Smith’s most moving passages describe the contrast between
ordinary people’s lives in growing economies versus economically “stationary,”
or even declining, societies. “It is not uncommon, I have been told, in the
Highlands of Scotland for a mother who has borne twenty children not to have
two alive . . . . In some places one half the children die before they are four
40
years of age . . . .” China was for him the great example of a “long stationary”
36. See JOHN RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES 107–08 (1999) (drawing on Mill).
37. STANLEY HAUERWAS, The Radical Hope in the Annunciation: Why Both Single and Married
Christians Welcome Children, in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 508–11.
38. Of the workers under a highly developed division of labor Smith says, they “generally
become[] as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become . . . . It corrupts even
the activity of his body.” ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 327 (Thomas Nelson ed., 1843).
39. “Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination,
not to raise the wages of labour . . . .” Id. at 28. “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice.” Id. at 54.
40. Id. at 33.
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economy, the consequence of which was masses of people living in abject
poverty. Of Canton, he wrote:
The subsistence which they find there is so scanty that they are eager to fish up the
nastiest garbage thrown overboard from any European ship. Any carrion, the carcasse
of a dead dog or cat, for example, though half putrid and stinking, is as welcome to
them as the most wholesome food to the people of other countries. Marriage is
encouraged in China, not by the profitableness of children, but by the liberty of
destroying them. In all the great towns several are every night exposed in the street, or
drowned like puppies in the water. The performance of this horrid office is even said
41
to be the avowed business by which some people earn their subsistence.

So the moral rationale for commercialism was “this improvement in the
42
circumstances of the lower ranks of the people,” and on Smith’s reckoning this
was worth the price that had to be paid in terms of commercialism’s offensive
and unlovely aspects. Any commentary on Smith and bourgeois commercialism
should recognize this underlying deeply humanitarian calculus, which
43
subsequent historians have confirmed. The humanitarianism that lies behind
Smith’s program, which seems to me quite Christian in spirit, should not be
ignored.
And Smith was not wrong. Over the last thirty years, hundreds of millions of
Chinese, Indians, and others have been lifted out of the most dire poverty by
those nations’ entry into the world economy. That entry was made possible by
various forms of economic liberalization and technological innovation, such as
the development of container ships. In East Asia and the Pacific, sixty percent
of the population lived on less than a dollar a day in 1980; the figure is now
around ten percent. In South Asia the decline has been from around fifty
44
percent to around thirty percent. Never in human history has the basic
material well-being of so many improved by so much so quickly. Of course, it is
also true that there have been terrible collateral costs. Suicide rates among
Indian farmers displaced by development have been awful. The environmental
costs may yet destroy human life on our planet. And there are many other
downsides. But comfortable middle- and upper-class Americans should not
forget how much we take for granted in terms of basic material security as a
consequence of the mass well-being and stable institutions that economic
wealth have made possible.
In addition, as I have already said, Hauerwas’s analysis of modern life, as
with the communitarians, gives too little weight to the fact of diversity with
respect to our religious beliefs and convictions. It is this, rather than

41. Id. at 30.
42. Id. at 33.
43. See generally JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF
CHILDREN IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE (1988) (discussing
the prevalence of child abandonment and exposure prior to the rise of modern commercial economies).
44. I’ve taken these figures from the web site of the World Resources Institute. I don’t claim they
are precise but rather that they are roughly true. See Population Living on Less Than $1 Per Day 1981–
2004, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (July 24, 2008), http://www.wri.org/chart/population-living-lessthan-1-per-day-1981-2004.
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“secularism,” that is the nub of the political problem: the only way to respect
people as equals in conditions of diversity is to grant them fundamental rights
and an equal political standing that does not depend upon the correctness of
their religious convictions.
While I think that Hauerwas ignores, discounts, or distorts important
aspects of the liberal political tradition, he certainly is correct that the public,
moral, and political cultures of modern commercial democracies leave a lot to
be desired. I return to this below, where I urge that we should learn from
important aspects of the Hauerwasian project.
C. What Liberalism Isn’t
I am going to turn next to what Hauerwas says about liberalism as a
philosophical matter in some of the places he discusses it. His criticisms of
liberalism are often aimed at aspects of our popular culture—excessive
materialism and consumerism for example—that liberals themselves frequently
criticize and that stand in the way of realizing liberal ideals of social justice.
There may be a price to be paid for securing basic liberal rights, democracy, and
a decent standard of living for all: people have a right to lead lives that are
45
excessively consumerist and self-indulgent. But liberalism properly conceived
also seeks to check these tendencies by institutionalizing and promoting the
values associated with social justice, civic equality, and deliberative democracy.
Liberals, in fact, will join Hauerwas in seeking ways to curb the excesses of
materialism and consumerism within the limits of justice, equal rights, and
democracy.
In addition, Hauerwas advances a number of broad philosophical
generalizations about liberal principles and practices that are dubious.
Following communitarian critics of liberalism, he argues that modern ethics is
increasingly thin and devoid of substance, and Christian ethicists have erred in
46
joining this program. The increasing focus on abstract and universal categories,
and the search for rules and solutions to quandaries on the model of law, he
argues, has severed ethical reflection from its necessary rootedness in particular
living traditions, including those of religious communities. Liberal ethics freed
from its “indebtedness to the past” is often merely procedural with the right
prior to the good; ethics “as law is often seen as that set of minimum principles
needed to secure order between people who share little in common[,] . . . [a]
procedural means to settle disputes and resolve problems while leaving our
47
individual ‘preferences’ and desires to our own choice.” Many Christian
theologians, he says, went along with these intellectual trends for the sake of
45. It is hardly an original observation that democracy may not always promote the highest and
noblest moral and cultural ideals. Consider, for example, Book VIII of Plato’s The Republic, as well as
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.
46. Here the influence of communitarian and radical (small “d”) democratic critics of liberalism is
especially evident. These include MacIntyre, Wolin, Sandel, Taylor, and others. The specific Christian
dimension is, of course, distinctive.
47. HAUERWAS, supra note 26, at 72.
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speaking to the wider world of non-believers. In doing so, they only succeeded
in marginalizing the specifically theological aspects of theological ethics, making
themselves—as theologians—irrelevant. Ethicists should be far more open to
the insights of specifically theological ethics, argues Hauerwas, and ethics in
48
general should be understood as principally a matter of fostering the virtues.
These are practiced in ongoing ethical communities and traditions; little if any
guidance is furnished by an abstract philosophical ethics that labors over moral
problems. It is hard to credit some of these claims. Academic ethics is a matter
of critical inquiry into contending moral theories and practical moral problems.
It is not primarily didactic.
So far as political theory is concerned, communitarian critics of liberalism,
such as MacIntyre and Michael Sandel, have a tendency to ignore or not
adequately appreciate the practical political problems that liberalism as a
political program seeks to address. Hauerwas also sometimes identifies the root
of our problems in excessively formal and philosophical terms, missing the
moral substance. So we are told that liberalism is excessively procedural, it
makes the right prior to the good, and ignores the fact that the ethical life must
be rooted in the practices and ways of communities and expressed in narratives
49
50
and traditions. This seems to me quite wrong.
In his book, Performing the Faith, Hauerwas makes the strange remark that
liberals “attempt to form a politics and ethics without memory. Rawls’s ‘original
position’ has seemed to me the perfect metaphor for the presumption that a
morally defensible politics is possible without the people who make that politics
51
being virtuous.” However, the “original position” is a thought experiment
designed to encourage the better off to put themselves in the shoes of the less
well off, and to look at the social structure, and consider its acceptability, from
the standpoint of the relatively poor. It is hard to imagine that Hauerwas would
object. To the contrary, the concern with the poor that is so evident in Rawls
seems altogether Christian in spirit. Hauerwas’s criticisms ought to be
addressed at Milton Friedman or Ronald Reagan, not Rawls.
The remarks about memory and virtue seem equally misguided. The only
reason to take seriously the thought experiment of the “original position” is in
order to take seriously the project of making the social order acceptable to the
least well off. It requires, at least if one is socially and economically advantaged,
putting aside self-concern in one’s capacity as a citizen, and taking seriously the
interests of all of one’s fellow citizens, especially those at the bottom of society.
48. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, How “Christian Ethics” Came to Be, in THE HAUERWAS
READER, supra note 26, at 37–50; STANLEY HAUERWAS, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological,
in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 51–74.
49. HAUERWAS, supra note 34, at 229 (“Liberal social orders do not have the means to
acknowledge goods in common.”).
50. I argued against these communitarian claims at length in Liberal Virtues. Will Kymlicka
responded definitively to the point about the right and the good, but unfortunately Sandel seems not to
have taken notice. See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 21–43 (1989).
51. HAUERWAS, supra note 34, at 224–25.
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The willingness to do this depends upon one having the requisite moral
motivation, or, if you prefer, virtue. Hauerwas says, more than once, that
“[l]istening to the weakest member is the kind of church government that is at
52
the very heart of the Gospel.” Such sentiments suggest a deep if
unacknowledged kinship with Rawls’ difference principle. Moreover, the only
way in which social justice can gain a grip on a community is if its basic liberal
values are embodied in institutions and embraced and deployed by actors at all
levels of political life, as well as by those extra-political communities such as
churches that engage in moral and political education. In much of his writing
Hauerwas seems preoccupied with what he takes to be liberals’ excessive
philosophical abstraction while missing the moral substance of their claims.
Hauerwas asserts that “one of the primary intellectual virtues for liberalism
53
is cynicism.” Hauerwas complains that “such a virtue” is “correlative of the
demand for autonomy that assumes I must be able to ‘step back’ from my
54
engagements. What I ‘do’ is, therefore, not ‘who I am.’” This seems to me an
extremely prejudiced reading of liberalism. Why isn’t it enough to say, with
respect to autonomy, that what “I do” does not exhaust who I am? For surely
people can and do step back, question, and revise their values and projects.
Hauerwas has done a fair amount of that himself, and he has written eloquently
of the experience. Autonomy requires a particular social context; otherwise,
there would be nothing to work with. The point about cynicism seems especially
inapt: Locke, J.S. Mill, and Rawls strike me as three of the least cynical thinkers
imaginable.
Michael G. Cartwright summarizes Hauerwas’s critique of liberalism in his
“Reader’s Guide” at the end of the very useful Hauerwas Reader. This brief
summary, consistent with what I have read in Hauerwas, highlights what I take
to be the core problems of Hauerwas’s views on liberalism. It names liberalism
as the “regnant political theory” of contemporary America. It notes that
Hauerwas has acknowledged that liberalism has “many faces” and much
ambiguity, but these evidently permit a good deal of generalization. Thanks to
liberalism Americans assume that “unlike other societies, we are not creatures
of history, but that we have the possibility of a new beginning. We are thus able
to form our government on the basis of principle rather than the arbitrary
55
elements of tradition.” This is hard to figure out. The revolution and the
founding of the constitutional order were a new beginning in politics, though
also deeply indebted to the past and inconceivable without the ideas, habits,
and institutions that Americans inherited. It is true that Americans have been
talking for a long time about having the “power to begin the world over

52. HAUERWAS, supra note 29, at 527.
53. HAUERWAS, supra note 24, at 224–5.
54. Id.
55. Michael G. Cartwright, Stanley Hauerwas’s Essays in Theological Ethics: A Reader’s Guide, in
THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 623, 635 (internal quotations omitted).
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56

again.” Reagan paraphrased that remark of Paine’s to good rhetorical effect,
but it would be wrong to take what may be hyperbole for a general
philosophical commitment of liberalism. In any event, no political people
invoke their “founding fathers” more than Americans. The constitutional
tradition has enormous legitimacy in America—too much actually—but that
belies the notion that our politics is ahistorical. Finally, the contrast between
“principle” and “tradition” seems to me confused: moral principles are needed
to do the work of separating the wheat of our tradition from the chaff of our
57
history.
According to Hauerwas, liberalism is mythological and ideological; it hides
and diffuses its power in a comforting myth, and thereby effectively tyrannizes
58
its subjects. The liberal myth is that
a people do not need a shared history; all they need is a system of rules that will
constitute procedures for resolving disputes as they pursue their various interests.
Thus liberalism is a political philosophy committed to the proposition that a social
order and
corresponding mode of government can be formed on self-interest and
59
consent.

This is a caricature: few liberals base their theories on “self-interest.”
In spite of his hostility to liberal political philosophy, as he understands it,
Hauerwas frequently says things that most liberals would fully accept:
[P]olitics depends upon tradition, for politics is nothing else but a community’s
internal conversation with itself concerning the various possibilities of understanding
and extending its life. In fact, the very discussion necessary to maintain the tradition
can be considered an end in itself, since it provides the means for the community to
60
discover the good it holds in common.

Authority and tradition for Hauerwas seem to involve shared judgments
formed through conversation; the conversation is ongoing, and through it new
members are inducted into the ongoing conversation. “Conversation” suggests
unforced and open exchange, on the merits. This all seems exactly right to me,
and Hauerwas seems also to recognize that freedom is a “necessary condition
for a community to come to a more truthful understanding of itself and the
61
world.” The church serves this freedom by being a “contrast model” for
62
secular politics. This all seems to me quite congruent with liberalism and
liberal public reason.
***
Liberalism was born in response to the problem of religious diversity, and in
efforts to establish toleration and, eventually, equal freedom for all. Liberal

56. THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in COLLECTED WRITINGS 52 (Eric Foner ed., 1995).
57. PELIKAN, supra note 23, at 76–77.
58. HAUERWAS, supra note 29, at 636.
59. HAUERWAS, supra note 26, at 78.
60. From Michael Cartwright’s concluding overview of Hauerwas’s work. Cartwright, supra note
55, at 637–38 (quoting Stanley Hauerwas).
61. HAUERWAS, supra note 5, at 62.
62. Id. at 84.
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constitutional democracy seeks to insure that everyone enjoys the protections
of due process of law; that governments are accountable to the people
collectively; and that political power serves the common good, which requires
paying special attention to the least well off. Philosophers seek to connect such
institutions, practices, and commitments with more abstract philosophical
principles, often in order to improve the system’s principled consistency. We
should try not to forget, however, that liberalism is first and foremost a political
program: its principles are meant to inform institutional design, the welfare
state, and democratic practices. The connection between liberal political
arrangements and very abstract philosophical commitments is often contentious
and may be quite tenuous.
D. Core, Periphery, and Popular Culture
I have suggested in effect that Hauerwas’s principal complaints focus on
matters outside the liberal core: on commercial values and popular culture,
sexual permissiveness, high rates of abortion, and mass patriotic violence. I
have sympathy with these concerns. So what are we to do politically? The
question is: Should we work to address these problems within the bounds set by
equal rights and democratic institutions, or do they require overriding these
liberal democratic guarantees?
Although Hauerwas is neither a conservative nor a neoconservative,
Hauerwas echoes their charge that liberalism undermines the sources of the
63
virtues on which it depends. It is true that that liberalism undermines older
virtues that are at odds with or in tension with liberalism. The traditional
patriarchal family and its characteristic “virtues” are undermined by gender
equality. Gender equality is at the root of very many of the changes in family
relations that are associated with the 1960s. Women demanded control of their
reproductive lives and that required access to contraception and abortion.
Women’s entry into the workplace and the availability of social welfare services
for single mothers made divorce a much more plausible option for many
women. Hauerwas expresses sympathy with radical feminism, so he may also
need to concede that some forms of profound social progress may bring with
them what some view as unintended social costs, such as a decline in lifelong
marital commitment.
Now, of course, there are many ways—consistent with fundamental liberal
democratic commitments to equal rights and opportunities—to address
problems associated with family fragility. Much more generous social services
and publicly funded child care, as in Europe, can lessen the costs to children of
family breakup. And of course, better sex education and easier access to
contraceptives could lower the abortion rate. Liberals do not stand in the way
of such changes; they endorse them. Classical or free market liberalism, what
we call conservatism in America, is often the problem here.

63. HAUERWAS, supra note 24, at 226.
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We might, therefore, consider the range of policy responses to various social
pathologies concerning the family and childrearing and other matters that are
consistent with equal rights. There is much we could do. It is difficult to know
whether or to what extent genuine liberal commitments to equal liberty stand in
the way of attractive policy responses until we hear some proposals. Vague
abstractions about the perceived social costs of certain liberal commitments do
not have much traction here.
IV
CONCLUSION
The practice of liberal public reason, properly understood, is part of the best
understanding of the virtues of democratic citizenship in a diverse society.
Nevertheless, if Hauerwas-inspired preachers can motivate Christian citizens to
oppose unjust wars, to press for greater opportunity for the poor and racial
minorities, and generally to work on behalf of a more just or more decent
society, more power to them! It is generally far more important to get people to
do the right thing than to get them to appreciate the appropriate reasons for
doing so.
Public reason opens the possibility—obviously still distant—that citizens
who disagree about religion and much else can nevertheless reassure one
another that their politics is based on sound moral reasons held in common.
Public reason as a democratic ideal requires judgment, flexibility, and a
pragmatic openness to alternative argumentative strategies. Public reason must
also be a two-way street, open to challenge by arguments from particular
communities and groups, including religious communities. Liberal democratic
public reason fails on its own terms if it silences critical voices or squelches the
justice-promoting moral energies of religious and ethical communities.
The virtues of civil deliberation are only a subset of the virtues of
democratic citizens, and a rigid insistence on public reason may impede the
64
pursuit of justice. Sometimes other virtues are more important: moral
seriousness, the courage and determination to actually confront injustice when
the personal costs may be high, sympathy with the downtrodden, a willingness
to work with others toward a more just society, and the capacity to articulate
and entertain unpopular positions. Hauerwas’s writings frequently exhibit such
virtues in abundance.

64. Perhaps this is what many critics of Rawls have in mind. See, e.g., PAUL WEITHMAN,
RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 13–35 (2002) (a sometime critic and—more
recently—a defender of Rawls).

